This papers eeks to reframes omewhatt he way we conceptualize issues of religious identityinthe contemporary world. Rather than the over-used conceptsofthe religious and the secular, the paperrepositions our understandinginterms of ritual and sincerity as useful corrections to an overwhelming emphasis on belief and unbelief as the primary components of areligiousand secular consciousness.These laterare seen as rooting in a very particular Christian understanding of what religionisabout. Thepaper further posits ac orrelation between certain modernisto rientations and the sincere outlook, while arguing for thecontinuing importanceofritualinteachingushow to live in afractured reality.
Introduction
Sometime before his tragic and terribly premature death, Ia sked the Italian sociologist Massimo Rosati what he meant by post-secularism.T he term was becoming currentinthe literature and Iwas never fully sure what it referred to.
1 Rosati gaveabriefbut precise answer. Post-secularism was the condition in which secularism could no longertake itself for granted.That is to say,inapost-secular reality,secularism was itself subjected to acritical and reflexive gaze,nolonger remaining the taken-for-granted"ground" upon which scholarship and analysis of other alternative -a nd perhaps competing -p henomena could be carried out. What was true for analysiswas of course true for life as well. One could no longer simply assume the secular as the ground of existence -asthe increasingly shrill debate over religionand secularism is indeed making more than clear. Fifty years ago no one felt called upon to defend secularism or point out the delusionary nature of ab elief in God.
2 Thes ecular world was,t ransparently, the world, and little was made of this fact:n or was it -e xcept in very circumscribed circlesarguedabout.
Formost of us of acertain age,the secularism of the State,the civic sphere,the public square,not to mention of political and moral thought was indeedatakenfor-granted aspect of our lives.And even if some of us were raised within more self-contained traditional -what many would call religious communities or sent as childrentodenominational schools -wewere aware that we were the outliers and each of us found theirown way of squaring his more personal experience with the world of newspapers,adult conversations and sports competitions.All this has of course now changed and the issues of religion and secularism are debateda nd discussed in both popular and scholarly forums,p roviding endless content for print and digitalmedia;positions are taken, calls to actionpromulgated, loyalties demanded and appropriate anathemas hurledatthe opposing side.
What Iwould like to do in this essay is to extend MassimoRosatis insight into the self-reflective natureofpost-secularism, and encourage us to adapt such reflection not only towardsthe idea of secularism, but to the very concept of religion itself,aswell as to related concepts such as modernity and tradition. Along these lines,Iwould like to raise the possibility that the very use of areligious/secular dichotomy is not ap articularly helpful one,a sw es truggle to understand the challenges of social life in our contemporary world. We tend to use the concepts of religion and secularity, secular culture or secularization as if these were objective, universal and value-free concepts that can be used to characterize aspects of shared sociall ife that are not religious.R eligiona nd religious,t oo,a re used as universal, objective and value-free concepts.Ibelieve this approachi sf undamentally flawed and we need to further explore the particular baggage they come with in order to properly proceed with any inquiry into the changes and challenges we are now facing.
Challenging our Conceptual Framework
We must begin by recognizing that both religion and secularism are concepts that developed in avery particular and Western Christian context;they are helpful in the sense that they can be used to describe aspects of and the potential for development of future periodsinwhich Christian civilization will take one formbut they do not actually serve us well when it comes to discussing, analyzingand understanding other traditional civilizations or other civilizations within which tradition is changing and being re-negotiated. What, for example, is asecular Jew? What about aJ ew who observes no commandments,goes to the synagogue only on YomKippur and does not otherwise maintain any traditional practices?Ishe secular, or partially religious,o rw hat?H ow do we characterize China and 1.3 billion Chinese?Ingelharthas called China the most secular country in the world. But look at theproliferation of spirit cults and other forms of worship.Surelythis is not secularinany usual senseofthe term. 4 What of the case of Islam?What of the individual or community whose observance of traditional commandments is partial, or almost non-existent?What of the Moslemwho eats during Ramadanbut only in private,i nh iding, away from the communal eyes?I sh es ecular or hypocritical?What about someonewho does not eat during Ramadan but does drink wine occasionally?W hat of those communities in Central Asia who celebrate the Id, by drinking vodka?A re thesep eople secularists or sinners or ignorant?Or are they like so many others, engaged in the never-ending movements, interpretations and transformations of their respective traditions,w hich are continually being negotiated and re-negotiated by communities and individuals over the course of time.
In fact, Iwould claim that secularism refers to avery particular moment in the Western Christian process of negotiation of its own tradition -aswas the Protestant Reformationand as is the phenomenon of Christian fundamentalism. All of the above are particular moments in the way the concrete practice of tradition mediates,t ransformsa nd negotiatest he tradition of practices that define any civilizationale ndeavor. That ap articular moment of this negotiation in the Western Christian tradition is understood in terms of secularism has much to do with the privileging of belief over practice,offaith over works and of Innerlichkeit over externalp ractice that has been part of Christianity from its origins (as evinced in its rejection of Jewish Law and its unique allegorical way of reading and interpretings cripture) and which received particular emphasis during the Protestant Reformation of the 16 th century. Secularism as unbeliefi st hus the complement of tradition understood primarily in terms of belief ratherthan practice. Ther esulting use -Iwould say misuse -o ft his term -t oc haracterize other civilizational endeavors,the Jewish, the Islamic, the Hindu, etc. -simplyrepresents the spoils of war, as it were:aconsequence of the power differentials between the Christian,Jewish,Islamic,Indian and Chinese civilizations.Indeed, as I have already hinted at:Iwould much prefer to replace the dichotomy of religion/ secularwith that of tradition of practices/practice of tradition -this being more structural, less particularistic, historicist and Whiggish away of conceptualizing what is usually understood as the dichotomy between religious and secular individuals,cultures and communities.
Western Europe,a sw er ecall, is the "secular" exception in aw orld that is overwhelmingly "religious". Or, in the terms Ia mo ffering here, the Western European civilizationi so ne in which traditional practices have been most abandoneda nd rejected:afact that can be ascertained by visiting any of the Churches of Western Europe and calculating the average age of those in attendance on any given Sunday.I ndeed, as research such as that carried out by Diehl and Koenig seemst oi ndicate,a ssimilation and acceptance into Western 4W eller 2004, pp.285-314. European society may wellh inge,a tl east for some immigrants,o nt heir abandonment of previousreligious commitments and ways of life.
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Moreover, this rejection of tradition is intimatelyt ied up with the overwhelming terms of collective identity.I nf act both phenomena may well be related. ThePeace of Westphalia and the concept of cuius regioeius religio may be centralhere.Europe,which was Christian, became acontinento fnation-states, and traditionalp ractices were subsumed in differentw ays within the newly developing national identities. 6 Parenthetically,Iwould like to remind the readerthat the USA may wellbe, as S. M. Lipset claimedthe "first new nation";but it is also anationwhere certain sectarian Protestanta ssumptionso ns elf and societyw ere allowed to develop relatively free of the effectsofthe Counter-Reformation, and of the need to take into consideration the existence of the Catholic Church in general.
7 Theg rand debate(often violent to be sure) regarding the terms of Christian tradition that definedthe Protestant Reformationand the Counter-Reformation in Continental Europe-and which eventuated in the development of secular polities and societies there -was,t oagreat extent,ignored in the New World and played but a minor role in the later history of the United States.T here was no ultramontane party in 19 th century American politics,nor was there aState Church as in Sweden, nor was there areligious requirementfor full citizenship rights.All of which does not mean that the USA was,oris, secular.Rather it means that they were asecular country in the classical, circumscribed and medieval sense of the term -referring to that area of public life that is outside sacerdotal regulation and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Secularism in the USA may then be understood as aconstitutional principle ratherthan amoralposition.
It ake note of these historical dimensions because they bring us directly to a question of what Ibelievetobeone of the great fallacies of academic research on what we call religious phenomenatoday -the study of religion in terms of identity. Wherever you go,inconferences and classrooms,inarticles and books,religion is understood in terms of identity.T his is,infact, the primary language that social scientists have at their disposal to discuss what goes under theterm of religion. As social scientists are not generallyt he followers of any sacred tradition (except perhaps that of Comte), they can but translate the behavior, attitudesa nd dispositions they find into language they understand, and the result is our rather simplistic understanding of sacred traditions in terms of the eminently modern problemo fi dentity -w hether of individuals or collectivities.S tartingf rom identity we can of course develop increasing concerns with authenticity,f unda-5D iehl /K oening2013, pp.8-22. 6O nr eligious homogenization as ap recondition for national development, see : Stein 1975 : Stein , pp.562-600. 7L ipset 1973 . On this issue see also :Lipset 1979, pp.34-60 . See also :Seligman 2008 and Seligman1987, pp.90-117. mentalism, collective boundaries,v alue orientations,p references and ah ost of additional conceptual categorieswhich are,atthe end of the day,nothing but our own attempt to translate aset of sacredpracticesinto the languages of the secular, social sciences.
There is nothing inherently "wrong" with this,other than that it does not get anywhere near the phenomena that it presumes to explain.Anobservant Muslim or JeworJain or Sikh does not, at the end of the day "do" identity or "do" religion when going about his daily rituals.R ather, he is following at radition, aw ay of being:b oth "halacha" in Judaism and "shaariah" in Islam meanw ay or path. Christianityisalso referred to in this way in the Actsofthe Apostles.
8 Thefact that today,u nder the onslaught of modernity and modernc onceptualizations many Jews and Moslemsalso conceive of themselves as "doing" identity (not to mention identity politics) is precisely what has given rise to the phenomena we label fundamentalist. Let me offer asmall example fromcontemporary Britain:Today, quite afew Englishmen and women, of Pakistani parents and of Shiite persuasion are finding themselves increasingly alienatedfrom life in the UK.They detect a new suspicion of them and an emergent reality of intolerance.Atthe sametime, they find it impossible to reassert their ties with Pakistan, as they are no longer Pakistani and Pakistan has no interest in them. 9 With the ground breakingaway under their feet, theyare beginningtolook to Iran as alocus of identity,inaway not too dissimilar from Jews looking to Zion and the political entity of the Israeli State as alocus of their own identity.T his then is aclear example of areligious affiliation,the way of ones ancestors,ananswer to the problem of Being, call it what you will -inthe process of being transformed into apolitical identity and articulated accordingly.InEurope,nationalism was built on the ruins of religious sentiment, in many other parts of the world;however, this is not at all the case.As noted above,the Peace of Westphalia marked the breakup of one ChristianEurope and its replacement by different national entities and hence identities. 10 The link between religion and identity is,h owever, neither necessary nor universal. What is particularly interesting is the growth of that linkage today,within different contexts -like that of Shiites in the UK, of certain Jewish communitiesthe worldover, of many Evangelicals tied to the Republican Party in the USA and so on. This however is ap re-eminently modern phenomenon and we must never lose sight of that. Its origins aren ot in the sphereo fe ither religion or tradition, but ratherinthe logic of modernity itself.
But hereagain,rather than observing the reality in question, we translate it into categoriesconvenient to our way of thinking.What often goes unremarked is the Stein 1975, pp.562-600. fact that the rootso ft his so-called fundamentalism are of the same stuff as the ideology of the socialsciences -that is asecular ideology focused on individual and group identity and the realization or, as with 19 th century romantic-nationalism, the expressive realization of both.Hence the suicide-bomber who leaves a note that beginsnot: bisminallah,that is,"in the name of Allah" -but "in my name and the name of my family". This precisely represents religion as am odern ideology -itsharesthe same conceptualframework as our own socialscientific inquiry.Itdoes not, however, even begin to encompassthe meaning or perhaps meaningsheld by what we term religion, for timeout of mind.
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Forwhat the term religion referred to before the contemporary period was not av alue,n ot ap reference and definitely not an identity.
12 It was often not even consistent and could only be articulated in clear and discursive terms with considerable difficulty. To this day,for example,there is asynagogue in Istanbulthat is only open for daily prayers in the afternoon (though morning prayersa re privileged most within the tradition) and where the male congregantsp ut on phylacteries (black wooden boxes containing scrolls observant Jews place on their heads and armsduringmorning prayers) during these afternoon prayers.There is no ideological, theological or normatively articulatedreasoningfor this deviance from accepted tradition. This is simply "what they do". 13 There is astrong pragmatism here. In this particular part of town, the time people can get togetherto pray is in the afternoon, during awork break,sothis is when they do so.And since phylacteries are an important commandment(and have been for more than two millennia),they don phylacteries. Yes, they know that everywhereelse people don phylacteries in the morning. They do so in the afternoon, because that is just how things are.T here is no great system of ideology; no theological precedents,justificationsoreven defenses are invoked. This is just how they go about doing what they have always done.I ti saparticular, what we may wish to term ritualist, response to our life in this world and the existential challengesitimposes.
14 What is taken for religion by contemporary thinkers,but has been understood by billions of people in the world as their own sacred traditions,i si nf act a response to the problem of Being. Thef act that most social thinkers today no longer understand this as ap roblem and ap erpetual challenge to the human endeavor leads them to acritical methodological error-for they impute their own etic categories to their informants and treatt heir own categories as emico nes. They construct great edifices of theory,b ut the explanatory potential of these theoretical edifices is severely compromised. Essentially,o ur contemporaries, workingwith amodel of the self as an autonomous moral decisor -that is with a model of the liberal self -cannot reallyconceive of asocial agent as anythingbut an entity that either has or does not have something -inthis case,choices;or, as an agent who effects actions -t hat is,w ho makes things,a gain -c hoices.W eh ave preferencesand we make choices based on these preferences.The great debates within the socialsciences for example concern the sources of these preferenceswhether in some sort of collective conscience,o ri namore Human or perhaps even Hobbesian calculus of individual interests. No one,h owever, doubts the existence of choice and the autonomy of the agent who chooses.What Ihave tried to hint at -nomore than hint at -inthe above remarks is that this in itself is avery particular constructionofthe self,nomore or less reasonable than any other -but one that perhaps leaves us in the dark about the motivations,understandings and existence of billions of individuals,today and in the past, who do not understand themselves to be morally autonomous actors,but rather see themselvesasacting out heteronomously imposed norms where the only choice is to observe Gods commands or not. And this is agood distance from the type of choice that rational actor theories,oreven moreculturalist readings of the self,understand to be at the core of socialaction.
To return to our focus on secularism, religion and identity,Iwould go so far as to suggest that the very use of the concept of secularism as acontrast to something which is "religious" betrays ap articular historical,r eligious and perhaps even ideological heritage that, of necessity,c louds ones glasses and skewerso nes assumptions whena pproaching the world of social phenomena. We mustr ecall that the very term religion does not exist in other civilizations.
15 It originated as a concept in Roman law and carrieswith it avery particular cultural baggage and no end of ambiguous meaning from the late antiquity onwards.L ucretius used it differently from Cicero.I nt he pre-Christiane ra it was best understood as an adjective rather than as asubstantive (if something was religio for me,itmeant that it was mighty incumbent on me to do it). With the Church fathers -Lactantius and, of course,later Augustine -religio reallybecame the way to posit boundaries, and to distinguish between the followers of the true religion (Christianity) and those of false practices and beliefs.Itis, if you will, afull-fledged ideology,avant la lettre.
Thepoint of these remarks is thus to emphasize that religious,post-religious and civil identities do and sometimes dont come together in all sorts of interesting ways and we must be very wary of positingao ne to one relationship between them,o ro fr educingt he one to the other. Moreover, the multifaceted waysi n which sacred traditions and civil identities interweave (or dont)m ake the existenceo fm ulti-ethnic,m ulti-confessional states and societies somewhat of a challenge and one that has come to define our contemporary world to ag reat extent. 16 Here,t oo,t he fact that our categories are rooted in Christian civilizational assumptions-even if they are of apost-Christian nature -isastumbling block to understanding and leads to all kinds of misconceptions. People may decry or celebrate the "return of religion" in the contemporary world.But is this really the case?W estern Europe,which was famedfor its secularity,has,toagreat extent, remained secular-except in terms of its immigrantpopulation and even they,as we have noted, seem to be under pressure to secularize if they are to be accepted into social life.T he churches are still more or less empty,orfilled with an aging population;t he mosquesh owevera re ad ifferent story.H ere the example of Bulgaria may be instructive.The government in Sofia, Bulgaria is concerned with the proliferation of minarets in the towns and villages spread out all over the Rhodope mountains.Y et closer inquiry shows that most of these minarets,while new,donot in fact reflect anew Muslim population, but rather a"sunnification" of the Alevei population who,under various economic and political pressures, have agreed to place minarets on their Jamyas and otherwise accept Sunni hegemony (at least externally).
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And while many of us are transfixed by the violence in the MiddleEast and the horrificassault on non-Sunni Muslims there,let alone the violence between Shia and Sunni Muslim communities that extendstoplaces as far afield as Pakistanand Indonesia (which held aglobalanti-Shia conference in April 2014), the internal negotiation -sometimes violent but not always-of what it means to be Muslim is carried out across the globe.
18 From Bosnia to Kyrgyzstan, Toronto to Tashkent different forces,actingindifferent historicaland social contexts continue to negotiatet heir traditional obligations and understandings of tradition.A nd while the congregant of the gay and lesbian mosque in Torontomay not feel comfortable in the main mosque in Bishkekthey are still both involvedinasimilar process of negotiation -which is far removed from any simplistic account of secularviz. religious understandings of self and society. 19 Islam in Kyrgyzstan is,asinsomany other places,as ite of serious contestation;a st raditional forms of Islam, often deeply embedded in pre-Islamic practices, are under assault fromvery different understandings of Islamic practice,imported by secondary elites,returning from schooling in the Middle East.H ere,t oo,w em ay claim to witness ap rocess of "sunnification". Yet, the very existence of agay and lesbian mosque in Toronto speaks to adifferent type of negotiation, avery different type of turn to tradition, no less important, and with consequencesnomore predetermined.
Rethinking Ritual rather than Religion
This negotiation, whatever its manyfeatures,does howeverpoint in one critical direction towardsare-engagement with ritual action which, in fact, is one of the interesting, if somewhat counterintuitive,developments of the turn of the twentyfirst century.R itual has been re-emerging among many sectors of society,i ncludingreligious society,which had previously distanced themselves from ritual acts.For example,wesee the reversal of the leaders of Reform Judaism, who have readmitted ritual to their religious practice in response to congregantdemands.
20
We also see the spread of orthodoxies defined in part throughr ituala ctionorthopraxiesm ight in fact be ab etter term -i ncluding the growth of Islamic identities in many regions,t he worldwide increaseo fJ ewish orthodox practice, and eventhe attractioninthe United States of neo-paganism and Wicca,orthe exponential growth of Yoga centers in cities across the country.
21 Theg rowing concern with apractical theology among mainline Protestant Churches is another indicator of this trend. Similarly,t he emergence of various forms of Neo-Confucianism amongChinese intellectuals also focusesinpart on the concept of liritual in the broad sense that includes both acts of worship and interpersonal rituals of courtesy and diplomacy.
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Given this social development, it may well be safe to say that one of the most dangerous misconceptions,our confusions about post-secularism,secularism and tradition, has given rise to lies in the very basic distinctionbetween tradition and modernity that pervades both the scholarly community and commonsense readings of world history. Such understandings typically includethe claim that traditional societies are governed by ritual -that is,bylargely unquestioned external norms,customs,and forms of authority that regulate individual lives.Incontrast, modernsocieties are seen as valuing individual autonomy,such that norms, customs,and authority are only accepted through the consciouschoice of the rational individual. Fundamentalist movements,according to this same line of reasoning, represent arejectionofthe modern world and an attempt to return to atraditional world of ritual.
Yetas trongc ase could be made for almost every aspect of this framework being wrong.Itisbased upon amisunderstanding of ritual, amisunderstanding of earlier societies,am isunderstanding of our current situation,a nd am is- understanding of movements like fundamentalism. It also leadstoapotentially dangerous normative goal -namely,that whatweand indeed all societies need is just more individual autonomy.What Iwish to do in the remainder of this essay is to explore the idea of ritual action, juxtapose it with am ore sincere model of human behavior, and argue for the enduring value of the ritual, in contrast to the sincere.Insodoing,Iwould hope to slightly change our focus from the dichotomy of religion/secularoreven post-secular to that of ritual/sincere -asanalternative way of understanding some of the sociala nd political phenomena that are increasingly defining our world order.
To no small extent, our ignorance and lack of understanding of ritual stems from arather particular reading of ritual and ritual theory. 23 Much modernritual theorythinking rests,infact, on understandings of ritual and religion that began to take their currentf orm with the radical Protestant rejection of Roman ritual duringt he Reformation of the sixteenth century,a nd that further developed duringt he Age of Enlightenment.T he most pervasive aspect of this line of thought was to read ritual as an authoritarian, unquestionable,i rrational set of constraints on the individual. Thea cademic analogue of such an approach has been ac ertain reductionism in the studyo fr itual, such as can be found in the functionalist theories of figures like Radcliffe-Brown. Eventhe reactionagainst such areadingofritual, like the interpretive approachthat grew out of Clifford Geertzs work, derivesf rom ap ost-Protestant and post-Enlightenment framework of the meaning-making individual. 24 Ritual, given such an understanding, seems less authoritarian,but only by positing abelief framework underneath it. Rituali nt his reading appearsa sn om ore than an outward enactment of inner states of belief.
If,h owever, we approach ritual from the perspective of other and non-postProtestanttraditions,weget arather different reading. Forexample,both early Chinese and Jewish writers provide ways of thinking aboutritualthat differdistinctly from both Protestant and mostm odern social scientificu nderstandings, and that shouldthemselves be taken seriously as theory. 25 These views provide a readingofritual as asubjunctive,asthe construction of an "as if" world. While many socialscientific theories imbueritual with acoherent worldview,these other civilizationaltexts on ritual assume aworld that is fragmented and broken. The subjunctive world of ritual resides in inherent tension with such abroken world, and such as ubjunctive world is at least implicitly understood to be limited and 23 Most complete reviews of ritual theorycan be found in :Bell 1992 and Bell 1997 . A useful correctivetomuch ritual theory in the social sciences can be foundin: Rappaport 1999. 24 Forexamplesofthis stress on individual "belief" rather than social practice see : Geertz 1973 . See also:T alal Assads critiqueofthis approach in:Assad 1993, pp.27-54. 25 These perspectives have been developed at length in Seligman /W eller (et. al.) 2008;aswell as in Seligman /Weller 2012. temporary.Ritual, then, involvesthe endless work of building, refining, and rebuilding webs of relationships in an otherwise fragmented world. Thew ork of ritual ceaselessly builds aworld that, for brief moments,creates pockets of order, pockets of joy,pockets of inspiration. There is,infact, autonomy in such awork, but it is an autonomy that recognizes the limited and fragmented world in which we always act.
Ritual, as aform of socialaction,has admittedly been somewhat disparaged in the contemporary world and in the prevailing discourse of the secular, what CharlesT aylor termed "the immanent frame". 26 Yeti ni ts formal, iterated and enacted moments,ritual presents aunique human resource for dealing with existencea nd with the multivocal nature of all relationships -w ith beingsh uman and divine. 27 Ritual definesand binds entities,timesand spaces,and in such border creating activities.Italso linkssuch entities,times and spaces to what is beyond their immediate field. It presents ac oherenta nd embracing wayo fl iving in a pluralistic and hence also deeply ambiguous universe,one where order can never really be known,but still must be acted upon. In our contemporary world, ritual has -all too often -been associated with reactionary and anti-democratic politics, with aworld view that eschewsindividual autonomyoreven rationality and seems to reject most of the shared values of all "right-thinking" -which often translates into "secular" -f olk.H ere Iw ill attempt to arguet hat not only is this understanding of ritual wrong, it contains also av ery dangerousa nd sincere impulse towards totality,o ne that has characterized much of the politics of the pastone hundred years.T his impulset ook an overwhelmingly secular formi nt he 20 th century-in movements of communism, fascism and Nazism -a nd is taking a strikingly religious form in the 21 st century -inboth monotheistic as wellasnonmonotheistic traditions -the world over. What characterizes all of these,however, is as triving for authenticity,s incerity,a nd totalizing politics that reject the essentially fragmented nature of existence and, by implication, the contingent nature of all politics.R itual action,t hough oftenh eavily frowned upon in todays world,especially by secular elites,providesanilluminating alternative.
When we say that the members of aculture share asymbolsystem, or aset of values,oracommon idea of the sacred,weessentially assert that they sharethe potential space of what"could be" asubjunctive world.Infact, much ritual action provides this shareds ense of am oralo rder -s ometimes even in terms of an explicitly shared "what if". When Jews convene around the Passover Seder table and are explicitlyenjoined to fulfill the commandment to feel "as if you yourselves have been liberated from Egypt" they create that sharedspace where the communality of the "could be" becomes the very basis of the ongoing collective experience.The Shiite enactment of the defeat of Imam Hussein at Karbala and the Catholic participationi nt he Eucharist are of similar import. Confucius, fa- 26 Taylor 2007 mously uninterestedi nt he worldo fs pirits,s till insisted that when "he offered sacrifice to his ancestors he felt as if his ancestral spiritswere actually present".
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When he offered sacrifice to other spiritualbeings,hefelt as if they wereactually present. Maimonides enjoins us to attend to our prayers "as if"weare standing before the Creator of the universe. 29 Themoralcommunity that Emile Durkheim outlined in his The ElementaryForms of ReligiousLife exists precisely because it sharesthe potential space of culture created through ritual. 30 That shared moral community is never the entirety of social experience in its full complexity of misunderstandings,c onflicts of interest, and incompatibilities.I nstead, it is a subjunctive construct, ashared acquiescence to convention.
In ritual we subject ourselves to externally given categories of order,w hose sourcecan be anythingfrom atranscendent deity (as in Judaism) to the natural ordering of the physical and social world (as in Confucianism). Ritual concentrates on the performative nature of the act rather than on its denotative meaning. In fact, pure ritual puts questions of belief or truth asidei nf avor of the shared world that its action creates and requires.The very external, performative aspects of ritual -especially its repetition and recollection of places and times not given to purelyrationalorinstrumental computation-give it aunique liability.Thus ritual encompasses the ambiguity of life in auniquemanner. It allows one to "play" with such ambiguity in amanner precluded by an undueconcern with the authenticity of ones actions and beliefs.Ritual unshackles the mind from aneed to believe in a dogmaofour choosing, as long as we act within its conventions.
Ritual allows us to live with ambiguity and the lack of full understanding.In slightly different terms,itallows us to live with the other,with whatwedonot fully know or understand -asindeed, we can never fully know or understand any other. Thep resentation of rituals "as if" universe,t he subjunctive,r equires neither a prior act of understanding nor ac learing away of conceptuala mbiguity.P erformance simply and elegantly sidetracks the problem of understanding to allow for the existence of order withoutrequiring afull understandingofit. In this way,it resembles all manners of decisions we must make to take any concrete action, where we accept that we have as much understandingasweare likely to get and even thoughitisincomplete (as it always must be), actionmust be taken. This is true for amedical intervention, afinancial investment, amarriage commitment,a declarationofwar or the planning of ahighway -for virtually all forms of human endeavor.Through its emphasis on action, on the performative and its creationof as ubjunctive universe,w ithout demanding aw orld of sharedm eaning, ritual creates aworld -temporary,fragile to be sure,but not false -, where differences can be accommodated, tolerance enacted (if not fully understood) and openness to the othermaintained. 28 Chan 1963 , p. 25. 29 Maimonides,p .4. 30 Durkheim 1995 While ritual activitycarries its own form of intentionality,itisimportant to note that ritual is not necessarily concerned with what is oftenunderstood as sincerity. In any ritual, as with saying "please" and "thankyou,"performing the act marks acceptance of the convention. It does not matter how you may feel about the convention,ifyou identify with it or not. In performing aritual, the whole issue of our internal states is often irrelevant.W hat you are is what you are in the performance,which is of course an externalact. This is very different from modernist concerns with sinceritya nd authenticity.G etting it right is not, as in the latter cases,amatterofmaking outer acts conform to innerbeliefs, of,asiscommonly thought, "meaning" what you say.Gettingitright is doingitagain and again and again -itisanact of world construction. As an ideal type,the self who performs a ritual is very different from the self who is sincere.
Unlikeritual, the sincere -with which Iwish to juxtapose it-is characterized by asearch for motives and for purity of motives, reminiscent of Kants preference of the purity of the moral will. Sincerity privileges intent -and hence,meaning -over action.This concern with intent has become the touchstone of much of our moral reasoning, for instance in Immanuel Kants writings on the workingsofthe "good will". 31 As Kant stresses:"Thegood will is not good because of whatiteffects or accomplishes or because of its adequacytoachieve some proposed end;itisgood only becauseo fi ts willing, i. e. ,b ecause it is good of itself." Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams cogently delineated the limits of this view in clarifying that: "However jewel-like the good will may be in its own right there is am orally significant difference between rescuing someone from ab urning building and dropping him from atwelfth story window while trying to rescuehim." 32 Nonetheless,f rom the Puritanso ft he seventeenth century to the talk shows of the twenty-first, aconcern with the inner wellsprings of actionand its meanings has almost become an icon of modernist culture.T he search for the singular and unalloyed (definition,feeling,impulse or intent) is very much at the core of the search for sincerity. 33 Sincerity,s eems by its very definition to exclude ambiguity.R ecall that its dictionary meanings include:" being without admixture", "free", "pure", "whole", and "complete".
34 SamuelJ ohnsonlists among its cognates:"unhurt", "uninjured", "pure", "unmingled", and"uncorrupt". Sincerity,carried to its extreme,isthe very search for wholeness, for the overcoming of boundaries and the positingofaunitary,undifferentiated, uncorrupted reality.Itisautopian impulse. In the continual searchtorenew the "authentic" sources of sincerity,there is little room for ambiguity.All ambivalence and ambiguity threatens the attempt to arrive at the "true"self.That true self can of course be very different in different times and historicalperiods.But in each case,sincerity tries to resolve all ambiguity to forgea"pure" and "unsullied" consciousness.Fifty years ago in Russia or China it was the search for a" true" revolutionary consciousness.I nt he midnineteenth-century springtime of the peoples it was to be at one with the spirit of ones folk, as exemplified in the epic poetry of Adam Mickiewicz in Poland or the Russian orientalist music of Glinka or Borodin.T he particular model of the "true" self may change,but the dynamic of ascertaining its presenceiseverywhere similar.This is adynamic that leaves little room for ambiguity,for mixed motives and for the complexity and contradictory character of most humanstriving.
Thedrive for oneness, for notational wholeness whether expressedinthe wish to be at one with oneself and with the world, or for eternal and unchanging truths, will always comeinto conflict with the reality of existence.Ameasure of hypocrisy complements any notion of at rue self -o ra ny otherc laim to absolute truthsbecausewecan never fully express an inner being -which is,atany rate,never unambiguous -and because any social interaction is mediated by language and other conventions. Shakespeare apparently shared some of this assessment, as we can see from the character of Polonius,inwhose mouth Shakespeare puts those lines about "tothineown self be true". He is after all ameddlesome buffoon, not above lying and spying on his betters,full of bombast, self-importance and deceit: am odel hypocrite,f or his great capacity for self-deception.S ingle-mindeda dherencet ot he "sincere" model of existence in the world does not allow for a somberand realistic vision of just how complicated, contradictory and ambiguous the sources of action, feeling, claims-making and intentr eally are.R ather,i t results in the continual production of ahypocritical consciousness that holds up as amodel what is essentially adeeply compromised, narcissistic and unrealizable ideal. It adheres to avision of wholeness that is not of this world, and attempts to implement it within the world,w hich has led to some of the greatest collective tragedies of past centuries.
In many cases -inlife as in literature -the almost child-like fascination with authenticity,w ith uncoveringt he "real" motives for action, the "uncorrupted" fount of feeling or the "pure" state of experience gives way over time.Itevolves into am uch more sombera nd realisticv ision of just how complicated, contradictory and ambiguous the sources of action, feeling and intent really are.Going one step further, true understanding and creative growth ultimatelyoccuronly by comingtogrips with this rather unromantic and severely compromisednature of our lives.
In contrast to this,the realization that ourboundariesare only artifice and that the world is fundamentallyb roken -w hich we can find in ar ituala pproachallows us to accept and even play with the inherent ambiguity of the world. Ritual in fact, incorporates ad egree of ambiguity within its very practice.I nm oving between differentiation and unity,ritual recognizes the ambiguous natureofreality and registers it, rather than denyingit. While in some senses ritual searches for wholeness,itdoes so throughrecognizing of differenceand ambiguity,rather than by denying them.Ritualdoes more than posit areality.Rather, its pattern is often the classic dialectic of positing areality,n egatingit, and ending up with a "truer" reality. Rituals opening to subjunctive worlds allows this play with different versions of reality and allowsfor recognition of the ambiguous nature of empirical reality,i naway that the sincere mode would find threateninga nd overwhelming.
Anti-ritualist attitudes -includingsecular orientations-tend to deny the value to this subjunctive of play,convention, and illusion. Their strive for oneness and for anotational wholeness,whether expressed in the wish to be at one with oneself and with the world, or for eternal and unchanging truths,w ill alwayscome into conflictw ith the reality of our flawed existence as attested to in the collective tragedies of the past century.Such attitudes reject the fundamental brokenness of the worldinasearch for wholeness and totality. And while ritual may teach us to accept and even to play with the inherenta mbiguity of the world, the very absoluteness of the secular and sincere stance attempts to exclude it.
What we usually call the "modern" period, with its emphasis on the notational impulse and its strong "flight from ambiguity",has given arare institutional and cultural emphasis to such totalizing claims. 35 As aconsequence,ritual has cometo be seen from theirp erspective,a nd has come to be relegated in our minds to a supposedly "traditional" orderthat the modern period has heroically superseded. Indeed, so pervasive have theseclaimsbecome that even revolts againstthis socalled "modern" era are carried out in the name of finding ever-more tropes of an authenticity that, at the end of the day,cannot be -and which we would in fact characterize as various types of fundamentalist movements.
These movements are rooted in what Eric Voegelin termed the "gnostic" nature of modernity.Bythis he meant, the reframing of the soteriological project of what Karl Jaspers termed Axial or transcendenttraditions in terms of immanent, humanprocesses that take place withinhistory and within the orders of society.
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In Voegelins terms:" Gnostic speculation overcamet he uncertaintyoff aith by receding from transcendence and endowingman and his intramundane rangeof action with the meaningo fe schatologicalf ulfillment". 37 In this sense Voegelin relatesG nosticism to the immanent natureo fC hristianity and shows how "gnosticism was an accompaniment of Christianity from its very beginnings,i ts traces are to be found in St. Paul and St. John". 38 However, he most clearly 37 Voegelin 1987, p. 129. 38 Ibid., p. 125. identifies it with the modernist program of sixteenth-century Puritanism. He saw the quintessentially secular,n ineteenth-century nationalismsa nd twentiethcenturyc ommunism, Fascism and Nazism as various forms of such gnostic approaches to political order. Many of the movements we call "fundamentalist" -whether Christian, Jewish, IslamicorHindu -are gnostic in this sense.They take areligious, transcendentset of meanings and coordinates and infuse it with nineteenth-centuryn ationalist immanent ideologies to produce ag nostic version of their respective religious traditions.S uch movements are quite common in the Middle East, where they characterize both the extreme-rightw ing of the Israeli settler movement (such figures as R. Ginzburg theK abbalist) as well as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine.
39 They are also prevalent in the Balkans where their ideologies led to the horrific slaughter of the 1992-1995 Balkan wars.They appear as well in some sectors of the Christian fundamentalist movement in the USA.
What characterizesvarious forms of militant religious fundamentalism -from radicalIslamicism to Hindu nationalism to the commitments of the radicalreligious right in Israel -isinfact an attempt to overcomethe ambiguities of existence throught he re-imposition of religious categorieso na ll orders of social organization.Inthis,their searchfor wholeness and an overcoming of all ambiguities, they are,noless modernist than the political movements notedabove.Ridding the Land of Israel of Muslims,orthe Dar-al-Islam of infidels,murdering doctors who perform abortions or attacking religious monuments in India (or for that matter, advocating ac onstitutional amendment that would ban gay marriage)a re all attempts to overcome the chasm between the religious terms of meaning,t ranscendencea nd unity on the one hand and the simple fact that the taxonomic orders of the world do not, on the whole,recognize these orders of meaning.The teaching of Hinduastronomy in India and the movements to reintroduce animal sacrifice on the Te mple mounti nJ erusalem among certain Jews in Israel today (seemingly more purelyc ognitiveb ut having as trong political element) are similare xamples of the same dynamic. So,f or that matter,i st he growtho f Christian banking in the USA among evangelical communities,where banker and client join hands and pray togetherinsearch of agood mortgage.
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Such cases exemplifyt he contradictory and often debilitating character of those forms of contemporary religious practicethat strive for totalcoherence in a world that, by its very nature,iscontradictoryand ambiguous.They suffer,asdoes the "secular", from the conceit of totality conceived of in immanent terms. 
Conclusion
Both sincerity and ritual are perennial aspects of the human condition. All human civilizations oscillate between them and combine them in various ways.W ang Yangming was no less sincere than Cotton Mather,the later prophets no less than JonathanEdwards.While both models are ideal types,neither can exist purelyon its own terms.N either can constitute ap erduring social order on its own. Each must be continually mediatedbythe other.
Sincerity taken to its final point would take one totally outside of social order. Themodel of totalsincerity is the anchorite (or de Sades fictional characters,ina reversal of the theme). The"true" self ends up in the no-self.The self disappears when emptiedofits social characteristics-age,gender, status,roles,and all the distinctionsofsocial convention. This of course is the self that we can see in social moments that Victor Tu rner understood as communitas and Max Weber spokeof as "pure charisma".
Human life,however, takesplace within society.Even those who leave society -such as beggar monks,anchorites,and saints (or sadists)-depend on the society they have rejected.Within the orders of life,one must always at some point step back from the extremes of the other-worldly abyss and reengage with the world. However, as soon as one does so,sincerity becomes mediated by ritualized forms of behaviora nd appropriation.O nce clothesa re admitted, dress codes follow, once food is admitted, food restrictions (kashrut, hallal, Lent, etc.)follow as well. These are the ritual markers of asubjunctively shareduniverse.One cannot enter the division of labor withoutalso engaginginall the ritualizedaspects of human interaction that both distinguish and unite those involved.
Theritual side has its ownconstraints.The very necessities of social life restrain the extremes of sincerity,while the very factsofhistorical/temporalchange limit any attempt to organizelife solely according to ritual. Time,and thus change,is built in to our existence in the world. Te mples are burnedd own, sacrifices rendered useless, priests slaughtered, and new modes of understandingemerge.All of this challenges the efficacy,indeed the very possibility of ritual. Ritual mustthen be re-thought, and thus becomesmediatedbythe reflective processes of sincere reasoning. Change results,i nvariancei sm ediated,a nd actors encode these changes even as they think them through. Recall Franz Kafkas wonderfulparable of the leopards in the Te mple:"Leopards break into the templeand drink to the dregs of what is in the sacrificial pitchers;t his is repeated over and over again; finally it can be calculated in advance,a nd it becomes part of the ceremony."
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This processdisturbs the formal order and repositions the frames of the world. It breeches existing limits,tears down constraints,and unpacks clichØs to let new meanings emerge. Thev ery openness of the future thus carriest he potential to question existing categories and the boundaries through which we constructthem.
Existing formsa re constantly contested and the inherent open-ended nature of this challengemakes the integration of ritual and sincerity an endless project, part of the continuing human enterprise.
In its leastefficacious moments,ritual too may deny change,mutability and the perduring contradictions of the world. It too may attempt to posit aunified (and universally applicable) ritual order on all realmso fe xistence. In an umber of societies we have seen this in various forms of fundamentalist movements,b ut also,indifferent 20 th century modernist (and sincere) political movements which sought to bend the ritual order to ap urely future oriented trajectory (think for example of the 1,000 year Reich or the communist world standing at the end point of history,"the finalbattle"inthe words of the Internationale).
Enduring social order rests however on some integration of af uture orientation (replete with its strong element of change and risk) with aperception of a shared past -ofties that limit, circumscribe and define,and hence give meaning. Communities cannot be totally future orientated affairs.T hey must always balance opennesstothe future -which is at its most basic an intergenerational onewith commitments tied to as hared past. As Hans-Georg Gadamer succinctly pointedout, the pressure towards ritualizationisrooted in the fact that "experience is valid only if it is confirmed;hence its dignity dependsonits fundamental repeatability". 42 Clearly,the relative valence of each is different in different traditions.C hristianity is,i nt heset erms,m ore future orientated than Judaism. A liberalcapitalist socialorder is more future-oriented than aChristianfeudal one. But some mix is always present. Some past referent and some future orientation are always part of any culture and every human order.
Theimpulse to inject the meanings and attributesofsincerityinto ritual is beset with danger.I tt riest os hort-circuit the endless play of ritual and sincerity and conflate the one with the other. Reformulating ritual in terms of sincerity works to the detriment of both. We must rather learn to appreciate,orperhapstoappreciate anew,both modes of understanding and to refrain from the impulse towards wholeness,t owards thet otality that seems to characterize so much of contemporary attitudes to both ritual and sincerity.
My aim here is not so much to advocate for ritual as opposed to sincerity,but to develop an ew appreciation of ritual, freed from the contemporary -a nd most often secular -frames of sincerity.Such an appreciation rests to agreat extent on a rituals formal qualities,rather than its substantivecontent. As argued above,the repeated, performative and anti-discursive nature of ritual, providesacriticalway of dealing with, rather than overcoming, the eternalcontradiction and ambiguity of human existence.Iam not, however, advocating an unchanging ritual -ritual historically undergoeschange,often in response to changed historical and social circumstances.Indeed, ritual traditionstypically includemechanisms for effecting change in ritual practice.Ia mh owever urgingt hat contemporary attempts to 42 Gadamer1973, p. 311. make ritual more discursive and more responsive to modern sensibilities must take into account the very features that make ritual au nique resource in the human encounter with the world.
What Itry to argue in fact, is that taking ritual seriously can help teach us about the tremendousdangers of trying to build atotally coherent world of notation -of authentic, individual truth-claims.I nstead,i tc an help teach us to recognize the fragmented and discontinuous nature of the world, the endless work entailedin building and refining our multiple and oftenconflicting relationships within that world, and the ultimatelytragic fate of that work. Andithelps teach us about the powers of ethical action basedu pon such at ragic vision. Accepting the worlds discontinuities and ambiguities means that the work of building and refining relationships will never end. Ritual, at least in its relationship to the rest of experience,i sn ever totally coherent and never complete.Y et doing the work of ritual is one of the mostimportant ways we live in such an inherently pluralistic world.
Theethical implications of the above argument are numerous.W eneed to rethink our history,t aking it out of the tradition/modernity,o rr eligious/secular dichotomy in which it is so often and mistakenly read, and we need to re-thinkour normative claimsaccordingly-once again taking thetraditional claimsofaritually orderedlife seriously.Among other things,this involves taking other, nonChristian traditions seriously -amove that would prevent us from identifyinga particular Christian trajectory with any intrinsic or inherent human or social developmentalp ath. It also should teach us to be wary of our categories and carefulinour use of concepts,freighted as they are with particularistic baggagehowever much that particularistic baggage may make universalistic claims.
Our very categories of secular and post-secular can, as Ih ave tried to argue here,b er eplaced with as omewhat different grid, to produce av ery different readingo fs ocial dynamicsa nd the forcesa tw ork in so many parts of todays world:inEurope,the Middle East and beyond.
